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Abstract— As more and more data is collected for various
reasons, the sharing of such data becomes paramount to increas-
ing its value. Many applications ranging from smart cities to
personalized health care require individuals and organizations to
share data at an unprecedented scale. Data sharing is crucial in
today’s world, but due to privacy reasons, security concerns and
regulation issues, the conditions under which the sharing occurs
needs to be carefully specified. Currently, this process is done
by lawyers and requires the costly signing of legal agreements.
In many cases, these data sharing agreements are hard to track,
manage or enforce. In this work, we propose a novel alternative
for tracking, managing and especially enforcing such data sharing
agreements using smart contracts and blockchain technology.
We design a framework that generates smart contracts from
parameters based on legal data sharing agreements. The terms
in these agreements are automatically enforced by the system.
Monetary punishment can be employed using secure voting
by external auditors to hold the violators accountable. Our
experimental evaluation shows that our proposed framework is
efficient and low-cost.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the era of big data, the amount of data existing in the
world is rapidly increasing. Furthermore, this data needs to be
shared for various critical tasks. For example, cities can share
the data they collected about transport patterns with different
stake holders such as transportation companies to reduce the
traffic jams during rush hour [1]. First responders and aid
workers share data between them to better coordinate disaster
relief efforts [2]. Of course, the importance of data sharing
can be seen in many other scenarios such as healthcare where
patient data can be shared among institutions for improving
treatment decisions.
In many use cases, a basic data sharing scenario would
involve a data requester (e.g., taxi company), a data provider
(e.g., the city) and the data itself. Data sharing can be a
constructive concept to improve collaboration, analyze and
utilize data to generate significant value, and maintain ac-
countability and transparency. At the same time, the misuse
of such shared data could create significant challenges. To
prevent misuse, reduce liability, and comply with regulations,
organizations may wish to sign legal agreements before shar-
ing data. For example, the data distributer would likely wish
to be notified if the data requester’s data server is breached,
and these conditions could be specified via a data sharing
agreement. Currently, enforcing such agreements may require
costly litigation, and managing a large number of such legal
data sharing agreements is challenging. Therefore, new tech-
niques are required to move the paper based legal agreements
to digital world where such agreements could be enforced
automatically and efficiently. To address this challenge, we
propose using smart contracts built on the blockchain that can
achieve automatic enforcement via monetary payments.
Blockchain, popularly introduced as part of Bitcoin in 2008,
is based on the concept of distributed ledger technology for
transactions to be stored globally as blocks [3]. Since its
initial perception as a cryptocurrency, blockchain technology
has evolved to more complicated systems, which can now
transfer data as well. Ethereum is the predominant blockchain
technology used in data transfers, and introduced the concept
of smart contracts or crypto-contracts. These contracts are
snippets of digital code that control and permission the transfer
of cryptocurrencies or data over the blockchain [4]. Similar to
the way a traditional legal contract defines rules and penalties
in an agreement between two parties, a smart contract defines
similar rules with an added benefit of being able to enforce
these obligations. Since contracts are on a distributed public
ledger and all transactions are known to all, the requirement of
a trusted third party is removed. This also gives an advantage
to the data sharing scenario of maintaining a permanent audit
trail. The immutability property of distributed decentralized
ledgers provides transparency and protection of vital data.
In this work, we propose a framework using Ethereum
smart contracts where data can be shared in exchange for
payment, and penalties can be enforced for breaching data
sharing agreements. Since Ethereum smart contracts run on the
Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM), which is Turing complete,
a smart contract can spawn another smart contract with the
same functionality as the original contract [4]. We use this
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concept of smart contract generation for customized data
sharing abilities between different data providers and data
requesters.
For scenarios where either the provider or the requester
breaches the agreement (i.e., the provider sends corrupted data,
the requester sends partial payment, the provider sends no
data, etc.), we provide enforcement capabilities by allowing
specific pre-designated third party auditors to securely vote on
the severity of the breach and decide on the penalty according
to the initial data sharing agreement.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We provide a novel enforcement framework for data shar-
ing agreements using smart contracts where penalties can
be imposed using a carefully designed voting mechanism.
• The framework is flexible in that it is able to support
different kinds of terms and conditions associated with
data sharing agreements.
• The framework supports decentralized data storage where
the data providers continue to store and control their own
data.
• Nuanced authentication and authorization can be sup-
ported by our encryption scheme.
• The framework is efficient in that it does not use unnec-
essary address space on blockchain and contracts are set
to self-destruct.
• We evaluated the proposed framework using the
Ethereum Ropsten Network [5] and showed that proposed
design is efficient and low cost.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section
II compares and contrasts our work with previous work in
data sharing using blockchain technology. Section III provides
illustrations and a detailed overview of the system architecture.
In section IV, we provide the steps users take to use our
system. In section V, we provide the details of how the data
sharing agreement is captured into a voting contract in order
to make decisions on agreement breaches. In section VI, we
provide the pseudocode of the working contract along with a
simple verification example. We discuss experimental results
of the system in section VIII. In section IX, we summarize
the advantages of our framework and conclude the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
To our knowledge, much of the past literature in blockchain
data sharing has been performed by health care providers,
biomedical researchers, and medical schools, so we discuss
this field in details below.
In terms of genomic data, Koepsell has attempted to use
a multichain blockchain platform as a medium to share
anonymized genomic data for scientific research [6]. This
blockchain implementation is payment enabled, and only
allows researchers to view the metadata of the genomes rather
than personal information of the genome donors. However, this
blockchain also only allows researchers to sign up as nodes in
the private blockchain. Data providers cannot sign up for this
blockchain and must instead provide their genomic data to a
researcher on the network. Researchers then upload genomic
data they have collected to share with other researchers in
the network. There is no implementation of constraints on
data sharing such as provided by our framework, and every
researcher on the blockchain has access to data shared by every
other researcher.
In the field of medical imaging data, UCLA has developed
their own implementation of a private chain to share data
[7]. Data providers upload their own data, which is then
shared with physicians and personal heath record vendors.
Although this implementation does support constraints on the
data sharing that limit which vendors can view what data,
it requires data providers to write their own data access
smart contracts and deploy them on the blockchain. This is
a complex task with a steep learning curve, so many data
providers might become discouraged and less willing to share
their data on this platform.
Medrec is a platform for medical record sharing based on
the Ethereum blockchain backbone, and allows health care
providers to share medical records between themselves and
with their patients, letting patients view an aggregate of their
personal medical records from all health care providers they
have visited [8]. Healthcare providers maintain control over
the patient data stored on their servers, but enter patient-
provider relationships for data access via smart contracts.
These relationships are similar to the generalized data shar-
ing agreements our system enables. All patient data access
and data sharing by health care providers are logged in an
immutable ledger. Medrec also provides the possibility of
payment for nodes working to confirm the ledgers validity,
rewarding these nodes with anonymized medical metadata for
research purposes. More significantly, Medrec provides a clean
web interface for both patients and health care providers to
view and share medical records, abstracting away the under-
lying blockchain and smart contract implementation. This im-
plementation solves the ease-of-use challenge. However, data
storage is not decentralized, with all patient data being stored
on the health care providers local database. In Medrec’s case,
the blockchain only serves as a simple access control checker
versus an enforcement mechanism such as our framework.
Many of these previous works provide a means to restrict
data access based on preferences set by the data provider, but
none give the ability to indicate a suspected breach with the
agreement after the data has already been shared. This makes
these systems not very robust as there is no recourse to data
providers or requesters when agreements are breached.
Although each of the related works discussed above partially
solve challenges related to sharing of sensitive data, none of
them address all challenges within a single implementation.
This project extends the above solutions for blockchain based
data sharing and not only provides an easy-to-use contract
factory API for generating data sharing contracts on the
blockchain, but also allows both data providers and requesters
a means to indicate that they suspect a breach and enforce the
contract terms. Also, data storage is truly decentralized, with
individuals storing their data in their own locations instead of
a central database that contains all the data. This makes the
system very robust, scalable, and adaptable to different use
cases.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE FRAMEWORK
Our goal is to provide an efficient, robust, secure, reliable
and a novel way to share data on a blockchain while following
nuanced data sharing agreements. The first step in sharing data
is for the data provider to store encrypted data on a cloud
server. The hash of the data is encrypted with a symmetrical
key hosted on the cloud. Hashing allows for efficient storage
of the data log. This storage needs to happen before a smart
contract is initiated to facilitate robustness of the system. We
explored the automatic smart contract generation capability
provided by the Ethereum blockchain and exploited its prop-
erties to have a minimal code structure. The minimal code
structure, also called contract factory, generates data sharing
smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain on the fly when
two parties wish to share data based on a legal agreement.
The terms of the agreement are decided off the chain. Using
our Web interface, the parties provide these terms to our
framework. In order to generate a custom smart contract for
data sharing, the contract factory requires some Ether from the
data requester and considers it as a deposit to start the contract.
The deposit is divided according to the following rule:
Deposit = Payment + Deposit Money + Gas Money. (1)
The generation of this new smart contract then triggers an
event for which the data provider is listening and provides a
notification indicating that the provider is required to share the
data. When the provider receives this notification, it sends a
message including the requester’s address/details to the cloud
address. The cloud then encrypts the data with the requesters
public key and since the data is already hashed, it gets stored
as a one time access link. This link will disappear once it is
clicked by the requester. This multi-layer encryption helps in
authentication, authorization and secure storage of data over
the cloud. The cloud sends the link to the data provider to
forward to the requester. Figure 1 illustrates the overall system
architecture.
In order to delegate the data link to the requester, the
provider has to pay the smart contract a deposit. In case a
breach is to be detected in later stages of the sharing agreement
and the provider is found guilty, the smart contract will use the
Ether paid by the provider as a deposit to the data requester
and the provider will lose its deposit. When the provider sends
the link to the requester, it sends the symmetrical key to the
data encrypted with the providers private key. When the link
is sent to the requester over the blockchain, the smart contract
dispatches the payment to the data provider without any delay.
The requester then clicks the one time link and retrieves the
symmetric key using the providers public key as a first step.
The provider then uses its private key to decrypt the data link
as a second step and then uses the symmetric key retrieved
from the first step to decrypt the data at the third step. Once the
data is retrieved the link will be inaccessible. This completes
Fig. 1: System Architecture
the data sharing agreement. The encryption process is shown
in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2: Role of encryption in our framework: This multi-
layer encryption helps in authentication, authorization and
secure storage of data over the cloud. H(Data) is the hash of
the data. Ks is the symmetric key to encrypt the hash of the
data in the cloud. Decrypt is the function used by the requester
to use the necessary key he possesses to decrypt the data sent.
The generated data sharing contract stays in the history
of all the three parties including the data provider, the data
requester and the cloud for a period specified in the original
agreement. The data sharing contract can be destroyed prior to
the contract time based self-destruct if both the parties agree
on its destruction indicating that the data sharing process has
completed successfully and no breach has occurred. Once
the data sharing contract is complete, prior to destruction,
the smart contract will dispatch the remaining deposit/escrow
paid by the participating entities back to them if no breach
has occurred or if a breach has occurred and there is escrow
remaining with the data sharing contract.
Fig. 3: Control Flow: The data provider stores the data in
the cloud. The data requester and data provider negotiate
a data sharing agreement off the chain and use our Web
interface to generate a custom smart contract. If either party
suspects a breach, they can use the smart contract to spawn a
voting contract to investigate the breach and penalize the party
causing the breach.
IV. CONTROL FLOWS
As seen in Fig. 3, there are several flows in our architecture
namely (i) requesting data, (ii) advertising data, and (iii)
breach suspected.
• Requesting data: In this case, the data requester will
retrieve the data providers address from the cloud and
send a message to the data provider off the chain to
request confidential data. The data requester will send
a packet designating the data share contract parameters
to the data provider over https, thus making it secure.
Once the provider receives the contract parameters, he
decides if he wants to agree to the request or negotiate
the contract parameters by modifying the packet received
and re-sending it via https. This back-and-forth transition
of the contract parameters in the form of a packet or
also termed as contract packets will keep going on until
both parties agree on a common set of parameters. Once
the agreement is set, the contract is created. The first
step is to make the data requester pay for the data where
the payment is made to the contracts address. The data
provider receives a notification regarding the payment
being made to the contracts address. The data provider
will now send a notification to the cloud to share the
data to the provider. The cloud using its encryption
policies sends the link of the data to the data requester.
Once the requester clicks on the one-time access link,
the link will be disabled and depending on the event
generated, the payment which was made to the contracts
address by the data requester will be transferred to the
data providers account. Certain amount of gas will be
utilized in the transaction processes, but that amount of
gas will be compensated for by the extra amount asked
by the contract for the data requester to make a request. 1
• Advertising data: In this case, when a data provider
registers with the system, his address will be sent to
the clouds address and stored in the cloud database,
so that anyone trying to establish a connection with an
acting party on the system will go through the cloud
to retrieve the address. This way the data provider
advertises his address to the set of data requesters, so
that they can start sending contract packets to the data
provider off the chain for an agreement to be established.
• Suspected breach: A breach suspected by a data requester
can be in multiple forms. Some common forms of a
breach would be (a) The data is incomplete. (b) The data
is incorrect. (c) The payment extracted is too much. A
breach suspected by a data provider can be in multiple
forms. Some common forms of such a breach would
be (a) The payment is not correct according to the pre-
decided terms. (b) The payment is not made at all. (c)
The requester violated the policy by sharing the data with
a third party. In such cases, the requester or provider will
start the voting contract. Depending on the decision on
the voting contract, the data share contract will penalize
the breacher. In order to do this, as a part of the data
share agreement before the data share contract is even
created, a fixed deposit will be extracted from both the
provider and the requester, in case a breach happens in the
future. Once it is confirmed that a breach has occurred,
the penalization process will involve sending the ether
deposited by the breacher and the victim collectively to
the victim. The breacher will not get a refund back. In
case a breach never occurs, since the data share contract
automatically destroys itself after a certain period of time,
the deposit ether will be refunded to each party on con-
tract destruction thus indicating a successful completion
of the data share contract. The only drawback of this
strategy is that the deposit will remain with the contract
while the contract exists in the network or till a breach
issue is raised and the breacher is identified. In case of a
1The reason why there is a back-and-forth transition of contract parameters
is because we would not want to start the contract with undecided parameters
since it takes approximately 30-50 seconds for a contract to be created over the
Ethereum network [9]. Also, creating empty contracts which have no potential
of being used is a bad practice. It uses up blockchain memory utilizing miners
time which could have been spent in them mining legitimate contracts and
legitimate transactions.
false accusation, nothing will happen. However, the issuer
of the accusation will have to pay an initial fee in terms
of gas in order to start the Voting contract to vote on the
breach. This can be analogous to the payment of certain
legislative fees in order to initiate court proceedings in
the real world.
V. AGREEMENT BREACH
If either party suspects a breach within the lifespan of the
data sharing agreement, they can call the data sharing contract
and spawn a voting contract to investigate the breach. The
breach can occur due to a multiple of reasons. Some of the
reasons include not receiving payment, receiving incomplete
data, receiving tampered data, data coming from an invalid
source, invalid keys, misuse of data, etc. When submitting
a voting request, the breach victim writes a description of
what they suspect the breach to be, and the compensation that
they are seeking for this breach. This payment amount can be
specified either when the breach contract is being created, or
default to the agreed upon breach penalty in the initial legal
agreement. We leave this parameter variable to account for the
different severity of possible breaches.
The CongressFactory smart contract provides all necessary
functions for the individual data sharing contracts to call
to spawn voting contracts, should a breach ever occur. The
CongressFactory takes in as parameters a list of arbiter account
addresses, the time voting should be open for, the monetary
compensation to be paid to the victim should a breach have
indeed occurred, and a description provided by the victim on
why they suspect a breach. The CongressFactory will be called
by the data sharing contract to spawn a Vote Contract, as
shown in Figure 4.
After a vote contract is generated and automatically de-
ployed to the blockchain, a request to vote is sent out to all
arbiters listed in the vote contract. The arbiters then have until
the voting deadline to vote on whether or not a breach has
occurred by the checking the blockchain log based on the
description of the breach provided by the breach victim. Once
the voting deadline has closed, the votes are tallied.
Depending on the decision of the breach, a penalty will
then be charged to the violator and the violators deposit will
be transferred to the victims account. The victim will also
receive the deposit put into smart contract by itself prior to
participating in the smart contract. This completes the Breach
Contract/Vote Contract. Once the Breach Contract reveals its
decision, it will destroy itself since its purpose is fulfilled and
its existence would only be using address space. If another
breach is detected within the time period defined by the
contract, then another breach contract can be spawned, voting
can be redone and the decision can be dispatched again. The
voters are decided prior to the generation of the smart contract
and off the chain as a part of the original agreement.
Fig. 4: Agreement breach process: A voting contract is
spawned that leads to penalties if the violation is agreed upon
by the voters.
Fig. 5: Legal Data Sharing Agreement: A short extract of
a legal data sharing agreement that includes terms such as
purpose of sharing, description of data, and purpose of use.
VI. FROM DATA SHARING AGREEMENTS TO SMART
CONTRACTS
Data sharing agreements define the conditions under which
the sharing may occur (see Fig. 5 for an example) and needs
to be performed by lawyers. In many cases, these data sharing
agreements are hard to track, manage or enforce and usually
require expensive litigation. Our framework is flexible enough
to capture and enforce most terms of formal agreements such
(a) Gas Consumption (b) Time Taken for a Specific Instance (c) Average Time Taken
Fig. 6: Experimental results of Data Sharing Smart Contracts.
(a) Error Bar (b) Time Taken Variance (c) Time Taken Standard Deviation
Fig. 7: Experimental results of Data Sharing Smart Contracts.
as purpose of sharing, purpose of use and disclosure. The
parameters required for our data sharing smart contracts are
data requester’s name and address, data provider’s name and
address, payment, breach condition, voter list, number of
votes for quorum, voting time and voting margin. Our Web
interface allows the parties to provide these parameters as
well as additional terms that are then passed to the contract
factory for generating a custom smart contract. If a breach is
suspected, these terms are currently manually checked by the
specified voters. We are investigating mechanisms to automate
this checking of agreement terms as an option to voting.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
Ganache-CLI, formerly known as testrpc, was used as a
test network for building the initial prototype [10]. We also
developed a front end to communicate with the test network.
NodeJS [?] was used the Javascript run-time environment
used to compile and test the functions of the solidity code.
The smart contracts were programmed in Solidity [11]. The
test network provided default gas and ether were used as
a simulated money to change the state of the blockchain
depending on the function call. Our framework relies on
voting for adjudication purposes. Public key cryptography and
Symmetric Key cryptography were used for encryption and
signing purposes.
The Contract Factory as a whole was deployed on the
local network using Ganache-CLI and the public network
using Ropsten. Truffle was used as the framework to compile,
test, migrate and analyze the deployed contracts [12]. A
client-server model for the application side of the system
was developed following the MVC architecture (Model-View-
Control) to make the system more realistic. Technologies like
Javascript, NodeJS, ExpressJS and HTML were used along
with RESTful API to make http calls to the server from a
client. web3.js was used as the sole library to interact with the
Ethereum ecosystem. The ContractFactory was deployed along
with the CongressFactory as a one-stop shop for the system.
The deployment of the contracts as a single entity worked
out fine over the local network, however on deployment of
the contracts over Ropsten, a gas limit issue was faced. The
issue was as follows: On deployment of the contract with
a gas limit of anything under 4712388, gives an out of gas
error, which means that it uses up the entire gas provided by
the contract owner and needs some more. On deployment of
the contract with a gas limit of above 4712388, it gives a
Block Gas Limit reached error which means that Ropsten as
(a) Gas Consumption (b) Time Taken for a Specific Instance (c) Average Time Taken
Fig. 8: Experimental results of The Congress Smart Contracts.
(a) Error Bar (b) Time Taken Variance (c) Time Taken Standard Deviation
Fig. 9: Experimental results of The Congress Smart Contracts.
a network accepts only transactions whose gas limit is under
the specified range. This poses as a deadlock for developers
trying to deploy heavy contracts over the Ropsten network.
The only solution out is to separate the contract into two small
contracts namely, ContractFactory and CongressFactory where
the ContractFactory is for sharing data and CongressFactory
is for making decisions whether a breach has occurred and
enforcing payments from the policy breaker.
The newly deployed contracts now take the right amount
of gas which are as follows: 3047711 for the ContractFactory
and 2913993 for the CongressFactory. The addresses of the
deployed contracts are as follows:
ContractFactory:
0x7c2842d44e7d4535b50f1c975d5cb04f5324ac8f
CongressFactory:
0x31e6b4f2be5aec35390f682e9369f385c4daa602
VIII. EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS
As a part of the analysis, in order to understand the speed
of the system, contracts were created in batches assuming if
a data requester would want to create multiple contracts with
multiple data providers depending on the agreement they have
off the chain.
While performing system analysis, the following parameters
were taken into consideration:
1. Total amount of gas creation.
2. Total time it takes to deploy the contract.
3. Variation of the amount of gas it takes in order to deploy
the contract.
4. Variation in amount of gas consumed on changing param-
eters.
5. Variation in amount of gas consumed on changing number
of voters.
Since the actual time taken from the the deployment of
the contract to the time the contract is mined by miners is
not determined by the network itself, a measure was taken in
the form of number of seconds it takes from deployment to
mining. On preliminary analysis, it is obvious that since the
time taken from deployment to mining of contracts is really
dependent on whether the miners want to mine the transaction
and also when the miners would mine the transaction, the time
measured should not depend on the contract parameters. It
should be arbitrary. However to measure the efficiency of the
system, each contract with a specific set of parameters were
deployed five times each to calculate the average, and standard
deviation of the time taken from deployment to mining. It is
found that the average time taken by the data share contract to
be mined is approximately 20-50 seconds. Also, the average
time taken by the CongressContract is approximately 25-40
seconds.
Fig 6(a) and Fig 8(a) depict the gas utilized by the network
in order to deploy the smart contract based on the number
of voters supplied in the DataShare contract parameters. As
you can see, the range to deploy a data share contract starts
from 1549929 wei which is the gas consumption for having
1 voter for the Congress contract to 1745750 wei which is
the gas consumption for having 10 voters for the Congress
contract. However, the range to deploy the Congress contract
seems to be higher than the corresponding DataShare contract.
The range to deploy the corresponding Congress contract starts
from 2181014 wei for having 1 voter in the Congress contract
to 2183669 wei for having 10 voters in the Congress contract.
The slope of each graphs are a constant which means that the
gas consumption will increase proportionally with the increase
in the number of voters.
Fig 6(b) and Fig 8(b) shows the amount of time it takes in
seconds for an instance of a DataShare contract and Congress
contract respectively to be mined by a miner in the Ropsten
network since the time of deployment. The graphs are not a
straight line which is understandable because of the hypothesis
that it depends on the miners interest to mine the contracts.
They can take arbitrary time to realize completion.
Fig 6(c) and Fig 8(c) are showing the average time taken
in seconds for each set of voters when the same contract is
deployed 5 times consecutively.
Fig 7(a) and Fig 9(a) portrays the error bar of the time
taken for each set of voters. The maximum deviation from
the average is shown when 7 voters are used to create the
DataShare contract and the minimum deviation is shown when
6 voters are used to do the same. On the other hand the
maximum deviation from the average is for when 9 voters
are used to create the corresponding Congress contract and
the minimum deviation is for when just 1 voter is included.
Fig 7(b) and Fig 7(c) display the variance and standard
deviation respectively for a DataShare Contract to be deployed
which is bound to be arbitrary since the time taken itself is
arbitrary.
Similarly, Fig 9(b) and Fig 9(c) display the variance and
standard deviation respectively for a Congress Contract to be
deployed which is also arbitrary since the time taken depends
on the network.
IX. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
As data becomes increasingly important for businesses,
governments, and research, better and more efficient ways
need to be found for sharing this data. Although data sharing
is required, in order to meet privacy, security and regulation
requirements, data providers need to specify nuanced condi-
tions under which the sharing occurs. Both the specification
and enforcement process of these data sharing agreements is
manual and done by lawyers and through litigation. We pro-
pose an automatic way for tracking, managing and especially
enforcing such data sharing agreements using smart contracts
and blockchain technology. Our framework generates smart
contracts from parameters similar to those found in legal data
sharing agreements. The terms in this agreements are automat-
ically enforced by the system and monetary punishment can
be employed using secure voting.
We are interested in exploring several future steps. In order
to increase trust in our framework, we need to be able to
verify the smart contracts and prove that they do what the
data sharing parties expect. We are also investigating easy
to understand languages and schemas that can be compiled
down to Solidity smart contracts. We would like to modify our
Web front end to accept digitally signed agreements written
in these languages, extract the relevant terms and generate
the appropriate smart contracts. This would not only make
verifiability easier but would make for an end-to-end automatic
enforcement framework.
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